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1. Introduction 
Children, especially eldest sons, are much more likely to live with their elderly parents in 
Japan than in the West.  Why is that?  What motivates elderly parents and their children to 
live with each other in Japan?  Which child tends to live with the parents in Japan and why?  
Is it possible to explain the living arrangements of elderly parents and their children in Japan 
using existing theoretical models of household behavior or do we have to resort to social 
norms and traditions?  The social norm in Japan has been for the eldest son to live with his 
elderly parents, to take care of them, to carry on the family line, and to receive the parents’ 
entire bequest including the family home, and it is possible that the eldest son lives with his 
elderly parents not because it is economically rational for him to do so but simply because he 
is adhering to the aforementioned social norm.   
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of the living arrangements of elderly parents 
and their children (whether elderly parents live with their children, and if so, with which child) 
in Japan using micro data from the 1998 “National Survey on Families (in Japanese, Kazoku ni 
tsuiteno Zenkoku Chousa),” which was conducted in January 1999 and provided by National 
Family Research of Japan and the Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, 
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo (SSJ Data Archive).  In so doing, we try to 
shed light on which theoretical model of household behavior applies in Japan and the extent to 
which Japanese households adhere to social norms and traditions. 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: first, our paper is the first to analyze the 
living arrangements of elderly parents and their adult children focusing on the number of 
children and the composition of children’s siblings in Japan.  We believe that it is important 
to take account of information on the number of children and on the composition of children’s 
siblings when analyzing the living arrangements of parents and their children because many 
models regarding living arrangements predict that these factors will be important (for example, 
the strategic bequest model of Bernheim et al. (1985) and social norms and traditions; see 
section 2 for more details).1  Many previous studies, especially Japanese studies, had no 
choice but to ignore children who are not living with their parents because of data limitations.  
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In this paper, by contrast, the survey we use contains various information not only on the 
elderly parents but also on every child, including the distance between the residence of the 
parents and that of every child, which will enable us to analyze the living arrangements of 
elderly parents and their children rigorously.   
The second contribution of this paper is to analyze the impact of social norms and 
traditions on the living arrangements of parents and their children.  The survey we use asks 
respondents about their attitudes towards their children, and since these questions capture 
whether or not respondents adhere to Japanese social norms and traditions, we can use them to 
analyze the impact of social norms and traditions on the living arrangements of parents and 
their children. 
To preview our main findings, the proportion of elderly parents living with their eldest 
sons is much higher than that of elderly parents living with children other than the eldest son, 
even if the eldest son is not the eldest child.  However, if parents live independently, it is not 
necessarily the case that the eldest son lives closest to his parents.  In addition, we find that 
elderly parents are more likely to live with their eldest sons if the father was a self-employed 
worker before retirement, whereas they are more likely to live with a child other than the 
eldest son if the father was an executive before retirement.  In addition, daughters whose 
husbands adopt the daughter’s surname are more likely to live with the daughter’s parents.  
All of these findings are consistent with the dynasty and/or strategic bequest (selfish life cycle) 
models.  We also find that the living arrangements of elderly parents are still very much 
based on Japanese social norms and traditions.  Thus, we find support for all theoretical 
models of household behavior other than the altruism model.   
This paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss four theoretical models of 
household behavior and survey previous studies, in Section 3 we describe the data source and 
sample selection, in Section 4 we describe the estimation model and estimation method, in 
Section 5 we present some descriptive statistics, in Section 6 we present our estimation results, 
and Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Theoretical Models of Household Behavior and Previous Studies 
In this section, we describe four theoretical models of household behavior and survey some 
previous studies that try to shed light on the applicability of these models (this exposition is 
based on Horioka (2002a and 2002b); see these papers for a more comprehensive exposition 
of the theoretical models and a more comprehensive survey of the evidence concerning their 
applicability to the case of Japan).2    
 
(I) The Dynasty Model 
The dynasty or lineal model of Chu (1991) assumes that individuals are motivated by a desire 
to perpetuate the family line, the family home, and/or the family business and hence that they 
will behave so as to minimize the probability of lineal or dynastic extinction.  Thus, if 
individuals behave according to this model, one child will carry on the family line, the family 
home and/or the family business in exchange for receiving a bequest from his or her parents, 
and it makes sense for that child to live with the parents because he or she will inherit the 
family home and/or the family business (which is often located in, or adjacent to, the family 
home).  
 
(II) The Strategic Bequest Model 
The strategic bequest model of Bernheim, et al. (1985), which is consistent with the selfish life 
cycle model, assumes that parents influence the decisions of their children by holding wealth 
in bequeathable forms and by conditioning the division of their bequest on their childrens’ 
actions.  Put differently, the strategic bequest model predicts that children will take care of 
their parents by living with them, taking care of them, supporting them financially, visiting 
them, and calling them in exchange for receiving a bequest from them.  One implication of 
this model is that children with one or more siblings will be more like to live with, and take 
care of, their parents than only children because the parents’ threat to disinherit a child is not 
credible if the child is an only child.  In their seminal paper, Bernheim, et al. (1985) analyze 
the impact of bequeathable assets on childrens’ attention to their parents using the 1969, 1971, 
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1973, and 1975 waves of the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey and find, as expected, 
that children, especially those in multiple-child families, behave according to the strategic 
bequest model, with the children of wealthier parents visiting and calling their parents more 
frequently.3  
Ohtake (1991) and Ohtake and Horioka (1994) are the seminal studies that analyze 
whether individuals behave according to the strategic bequest model in Japan.  They examine 
the determinants of the co-residence behavior of parents and their children using data from the 
1986 “National Livelihood Survey (Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chousa),” conducted by the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of the Government of Japan, and find that the 
likelihood of coresidence increases as the bequeathable wealth of elderly parents increases, 
which is consistent with the strategic bequest model (see also Horioka, et al. (2000)). 
 
(III) The Altruism Model 
The altruism model of Barro (1974) and Becker (1974, 1981, 1991) assumes that parents 
harbor intergenerational altruism towards their children and that they derive utility not only 
from their own consumption but also from the utility of their children.  In this case, parents 
will leave a bequest to their children regardless of whether or not they receive financial 
support and/or care from their children during old age and regardless of whether or not their 
children live with them.  By the same token, if children are altruistic toward their parents, 
they will live with, and take care of, their parents even if their parents do not leave a bequest 
to them.  Thus, if individuals behave according to the altruism model, there should be no 
relationship between living arrangements and bequest motives.  
Hayashi (1995) tries to shed light on whether the Japanese behave according to the 
altruism model by testing whether demand neutrality---the invariance of consumption demand 
to the division of resources within families---holds for families choosing co-residence using 
the 1979 and 1984 administrations of the “National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure 
(Zenkoku Shouhi Jittai Chousa),” conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications.  He finds that this neutrality implication does not apply in Japan because 
 5
expenditures on precisely the food items favored by the older generation are found to be an 
increasing function of the older generation’s share of resources and concludes that the altruism 
model does not apply in Japan. 
 
(IV) Social Norms and Traditions  
In Japan, it is customary for children, especially eldest sons, to live with, and take care of, 
their parents even if their parents do not leave a bequest to them.  This custom arises not 
from economic considerations but from social norms and traditions—in particular, from the 
Confucian teaching that, when children grow up, they should respect, and take care of, their 
parents even if their parents do not leave a bequest to them.  The observed behavior—that 
children live with, and take care of, their parents even if their parents do not leave a bequest to 
them--is identical to the case in which children are altruistic toward their parents (model III 
above), but the mechanism is totally different.  Note, however, that social norms also dictate 
that parents leave a bequest to their children, especially to their eldest son, and thus, even in 
the case of social norms, we could observe children, especially the eldest son, living with their 
elderly parents and, at the same time, receiving a bequest from their parents, a pattern that is 
identical to the case of the strategic bequest model (model II above), even though the 
mechanism is totally different.4 
 
3. The Data Source and Sample Selection 
3.1. The Data Source 
The data source we use is micro data from the 1998 “National Survey of Families (in Japanese, 
Kazoku ni tsuiteno Zenkoku Chousa)” which was conducted in January 1999 and provided by 
National Family Research of Japan and the Information Center for Social Science Research on 
Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo (SSJ Data Archive). 
This survey collects a variety of detailed information on respondents and their family 
members--for example, on the structure of respondents’ families, the socioeconomic 
characteristics of both parents and children, respondents’ attitudes towards their children, etc. 
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In this survey, a stratified multistage random sample of 10,500 respondents aged 
between 28 and 77 (born between January 1, 1921 and December 31, 1970) from throughout 
Japan was surveyed by the drop-off, pick-up method, resulting in 6,985 responses (a response 
rate of 66.5%). 
  
3.2. Sample Selection 
In this subsection, we discuss the sample we used in our analysis.  Of the 6,985 respondents 
(hereafter called parents (fathers and mothers) or households), 1070 have no living children, 
952 have one living child, 3067 have two living children, 1515 have three living children, 372 
have four or more living children, and 9 did not indicate how many living children they have.  
First, we used only the subsample of respondents who have one, two, or three living children.  
Respondents who have four or more living children provide information only on the three 
oldest children, so we were forced to drop these respondents.  Second, we used only the 
subsample of respondents whose children have been married at least once because we wanted 
to focus on adult children and because there are many young unmarried children in Japan who 
live with their parents temporarily before marriage and are supported by their parents (in Japan, 
they are called “parasite singles”).  Third, we are interested in the living arrangements of 
“elderly” parents and their adult children, so we confined the sample to parents who have 
already retired.5   Finally, we dropped all observations for which all of the necessary 
information is not available.  Restricting the sample to parents who have one, two and three 
living children reduced the number of observations from 6,985 to 5,367, restricting the sample 
to parents whose children are all married reduced the number of observations further to 1,383, 
restricting the sample to parents who are retired reduced the number of observations further to 
759, and restricting the sample to parents for whom all of the necessary information is 
available reduced the number of observations further to 530.  This is the sample we use to 
compute the descriptive statistics in Tables 1-3. 
However, we need to restrict the sample further to respondents with multiple children 
including at least one son in the regression analysis because only those fitting this description 
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will be able to choose between living with their eldest son, living with a child other than the 
eldest son, and living independently.  Thus, the sample we use in the regression analysis has 
only 336 observations.  Of the 194 observations that had to be dropped, 132 had only 
daughters and 62 had one son and no daughters (see Table 1 for data on the number of children 
and the composition of siblings). 
 
4. The Estimation Model and Estimation Method 
4.1. The Estimation Model 
We use the following estimation model to test what variables affect the living arrangements of 
parents and their children:  
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The dependent variable (LIVING) measures three alternative living arrangements of 
elderly parents: parents live with the eldest son; parents live with a child other than the eldest 
son;6 and parents live independently.  We define “parents live with their children” as “the 
child lives in the same house as his/her parents or in a separate house on the same property.” 
The explanatory variables are pix , 
e
ix and
k
ix where 
p
ix  is a vector of characteristics 
pertaining to parents’ preferences and economic background, eix  is a vector of characteristics 
pertaining to the eldest son’s preferences and economic background, and kix  is a vector of 
characteristics pertaining to the preferences and economic background of children other than the 
eldest son.  Our main interest is to shed light on which model(s) of household behavior apply 
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in Japan by analyzing the determinants of the living arrangements of parents and their children 
in the case of those with multiple children.  In what follows, we explain the impact of each 
explanatory variable on the living arrangements of parents and their children using on the 
theoretical models introduced in Section 2.  
  
(I) The Dynasty Model 
To examine whether individuals behave according to the dynasty model, we use hselfemployed 
(a dummy variable that equals one if the father was a self-employed worker before retirement 
(the base category is fathers who were salaried workers before retirement)), ewifefamily1 (a 
dummy variable that equals one if the eldest son adopts his wife’s surname)), kwifefamily1 (a 
dummy variable that equals one if at least one son other than the eldest son adopts his wife’s 
surname), kwifefamily2 (a dummy variable that equals one if at least one daughter married a 
man who adopted her surname).   
Self-employed households are different from salaried worker households because the 
former have a family business that they would presumably like to pass on to their children.  If 
the dynasty model applies, the children of self-employed parents will take over the family 
business in exchange for receiving a bequest (especially the family business), and since family 
businesses are often located in, or adjacent to, the parents’ home, the child who takes over the 
family business is more likely to live with his/her parents.  Thus, if individuals behave 
according to the dynasty model, we would expect hselfemployed to increase the probability of 
the parents living with the eldest son or with a child other than the eldest son.   
Another variant of the dynasty model is that a son (usually the eldest son) carries on the 
family line in return for receiving a bequest (especially the family home) or (if there are no 
sons) a daughter (usually the eldest daughter) marries a man who is willing to adopt her 
surname and carries on the family line in return for receiving a bequest (especially the family 
home).  Moreover, the child who carries on the family line usually lives with the parents since 
they will usually inherit the family home.  Thus, if individuals behave according to the dynasty 
model, we would expect ewifefamily1 to reduce the probability of the parents living with the 
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eldest son, kwifefamily1 to reduce the probability of the parents living with a child other than the 
eldest son, and kwifefamily2 to increase the probability of the parents living with a child other 
than the eldest son. 
 
(II) The Strategic Bequest Model 
To examine whether individuals behave according to the strategic bequest model, we include 
hexecutive (a dummy variable that equals one if the father was an executive before retirement 
(where executive includes management executive, executive board member, and 
management-level employee (including government workers)) (the base category is fathers who 
were salaried workers before retirement)), peduc (the average educational attainment (in years) 
of the parents (if there is only one parent, the educational attainment of that parent)), pincome 
(the income of the father and mother combined), and phouse (a dummy variable that equals one 
if the parents live in an owner-occupied home).  If the father was an executive before 
retirement, if the parents are highly educated, and/or if the combined income of the parents is 
high, the parents are presumably relatively wealthy and should have more wealth to leave 
behind to their children, and thus the children should be more likely to live with their parents if 
the strategic bequest motive applies.  By the same token, the children of parents who are 
homeowners should also be more likely to live with their parents if the strategic bequest motive 
applies because they can expect to receive the family home as a bequest.  Thus, if the strategic 
bequest model applies, we would expect hexecutive, peduc, pincome, and phouse to increase the 
probability of the parents living with their eldest son or with a child other than the eldest son. 
 
(III) The Altruism Model 
If individuals behave according to the altruism model, we would expect the coefficients of the 
aforementioned variables (hselfemployed, ewifefamily1, kwifefamily1, kwifefamily2, hexecutive, 
peduc, pincome, and phouse) to be insignificant because the residential choice decision of 
parents and their children should not depend on any dynastic or strategic considerations.  
Moreover, we included eeduc (the educational attainment of the eldest son (in years)) and keduc 
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(the educational attainment of child (ren) other than the eldest son (if the number of children is 
two, the average educational attainment of children other than the eldest son is used) as a way of 
testing the altruism model more directly.  As Horioka (2002) points out, altruistic parents 
should leave larger bequests to poorer children, and since education is a good proxy for earning 
capacity, altruistic parents should leave larger bequests to less educated children.  Moreover, 
since the family home is often the largest component of parental wealth, it is plausible to 
assume that altruistic parents will choose to live with the least educated (poorest) child and 
bequeath the family home to him or her.  Thus, we would expect eeduc to reduce the 
probability of the parents living with the eldest son and keduc to reduce the probability of the 
parents living with a child other than the eldest son.  
We also include a variable pertaining to parental attitudes towards their children to enable 
us to conduct a further test of the altruism model.  In the survey we use in our analysis, 
respondents were asked if they agree with a number of views concerning their attitudes 
towards their children, one of which is: “Parents should sacrifice themselves for their 
children.”  Respondents were asked to pick from among the following four choices.   
(1) I think so.   
(2) I tend to think so.  
(3) I tend not to think so.  
(4) I do not think so. 
We created the variable psacrifice (a dummy variable that equals one if parents think (or tend to 
think) that parents should sacrifice themselves for their children) and added it to equation (1).  
This variable is presumably a good proxy for parents who behave according to the altruism 
model because those who agree with this view are willing to put the interests of their children 
before their own.  However, since it is not obvious whether altruistic parents will be more or 
less likely to live with their children, it is not possible to predict a priori whether the coefficient 
of psacrifice will be positive or negative. 
 Finally, another way to test the altruism model is to see if variables relating to the 
dynasty and strategic bequest models have the expected impact on the likelihood of parents 
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living with their children.  If they do, this constitutes evidence unfavorable to the altruism 
model because the altruism model predicts that the behavior of parents and children will be 
motivated by altruism rather than by some sort of quid pro quo. 
 
(IV) Social Norms and Traditions    
We tested for the importance of Japanese social norms and traditions using two variables created 
from the same question on parental attitudes towards their children discussed in (III) above.  
Two other views that are asked about are as follows: 
(a) Children should live with their parents when the parents become old and cannot take care 
of themselves.  
(b) It is an eldest son’s duty to take care of his parents.  
View (a) is consistent with the Japanese social norm or tradition (based on Confucian 
teachings) that children should live with, and take care of, their parents when their parents 
become old, while view (b) is consistent with the Japanese social norm or tradition that more 
is expected of the eldest son.  Thus, we created the variables pchildduty and pesonduty 
(dummy variables that equal one if the respondent agrees (or tends to agree) with views (a) 
and (b), respectively), and added them to equation (1).  If individuals behave according to 
Japanese social norms and traditions, we would expect pchildduty to increase the probability 
of the parents living with the eldest son or with a child other than the eldest son and pesonduty 
to increase the probability of the parents living with the eldest son.7 
 
Control Variables 
Finally, we also include the variables psingle (a dummy variable that equals one if there 
is only one parent), hparttimer (a dummy variable that equals one if the father was a part-time 
worker or had an occupation not listed elsewhere before retirement), phealth (a dummy variable 
that equals one if one or both parents are unhealthy), esingle (a dummy variable that equals one 
if the eldest son is single), emarriagefirst (a dummy variable that equals one if the eldest son got 
married first), ksingle (a dummy variable that equals one if at least one child other than the 
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eldest son is single), seniorsister (a dummy variable that equals one if the eldest son has an 
elder sister), and three (a dummy variable that equals one if the eldest son has two siblings) to 
control for the preferences and economic backgrounds of parents and children.   
 
4.2. The Estimation Method 
In our analysis, we estimate equation (1) using a multinomial probit model because the 
dependent variable LIVING has three unordered response outcomes.  One advantage of this 
model is that it allows us to relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property 
that is characteristic of the multinomial logistic model.  As we stated earlier, the dependent 
variable (LIVING) measures three alternative living arrangements of elderly parents: parents 
live with their eldest son; parents live with a child other than the eldest son; and parents live 
independently, so the term in the log-likelihood that corresponds to alternative 1 (that is, 
parents live with their eldest son) is  
[ ] [ ]kepj xxx, j=UUobob ,,32,>Pr=Pr 1  1 choice , 
and the probability of this alternative is  
[ ] [ ]kep xxxβxxεεβxxεεobob ,,)′-(>-,)′-(>-Pr=Pr 13131212   1 choice　 , 
which is the cumulative probability from the bivariate normal distribution.8   
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
5.1. Data on Who Lives With or Near the Parents 
Before discussing the estimation results, we present some descriptive statistics to give the reader 
a general idea of the living arrangements of elderly parents and their children in Japan.  First, 
Table 2-1 shows with which child elderly parents live, and as can be seen from this table, 44 
percent of elderly parents with at least one child live with their children, which is much higher 
than in Western countries.  Looking at the breakdown by number of children, 40 percent of 
elderly parents with only one child live with their children, 39 percent of elderly parents with 
two children live with their children, and 62 percent of elderly parents with three children live 
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with their children. 
 Looking more specifically at with which child elderly parents live, two interesting 
patterns emerge.  First, if elderly parents have an eldest son, they are much more likely to live 
with their eldest sons than to live with children other than the eldest son, even if the eldest son is 
not the eldest child (see the boldfaced figures in Table 2-1).  Second, if parents have only 
daughters, they are more likely to live with their eldest daughter.  These results are consistent 
with the Japanese social norm that the eldest son (or eldest child) should live with, and take care 
of, the parents.  
We look next at which child lives closest to his/her elderly parents.  The survey we 
use in our analysis collects information on the distance between the parents’ residence and 
each child’s residence using the following categories: (1) the child lives in the same house as 
his/her parents, (2) the child lives in a separate house on the same property, (3) the parents’ 
residence and the child’s residence are within walking distance, (4) the travel time between the 
parents’ residence and the child’s residence is less than one hour, (5) the travel time between 
the parents’ residence and the child’s residence is less than three hours, and (6) the travel time 
between the parents’ residence and the child’s residence is equal to, or more than, three hours.  
Since we define “parents live with their children” as “the child lives in the same house as 
his/her parents or in a separate house on the same property (alternatives (1) or (2)),” there are 
four categories for parents and children who live apart.  Data on which child lives closest to 
the parents in the case of parents who live independently are shown in Table 2-2, and as can be 
seen from this table, if parents live independently, it is not necessarily the case that the eldest 
son lives closest to his parents.  
We look next at data on sons who adopt their wives’ surname and daughters whose 
husbands adopt their surname.  Such data shed light on the importance of the dynasty model 
because a son who adopts his wife’s surname cannot carry on his parents’ family line, and 
conversely, a daughter whose husband adopts her surname can carry on her parents’ family 
line.  If the dynasty model applies and parents care about perpetuating the family line, we 
would not expect parents with only one son and no daughters (hereafter referred to as “single 
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sons”) to allow their sons to adopt their wives’ surname, and conversely, we would expect 
parents with only daughters to encourage at least one of their daughters to marry a man who is 
willing to adopt their surname. 
Looking at the results, only 1.6 percent (1/62) of single sons adopt their wives’ 
surname, whereas 3.6 percent (12/336) of eldest sons who have siblings and 10.2 percent 
(17/166) of second-born sons and third-born sons do so, which suggests that eldest son are far 
less likely to adopt their wives’ surname.  On the other hand, 18.2 percent (8/44) of single 
daughters marry a man who adopts her surname, and 13.8 percent (26/196) of daughters who 
have only sisters marry a man who adopts her surname, whereas only 4.8 percent (13/273) of 
daughters who have at least one brother marry such a man.  Furthermore, 20.5 percent 
(18/88) of eldest daughters marry a man who adopts her surname, whereas only 7.4 percent 
(8/108) of daughters other than eldest daughters marry such a man.  Thus, households that 
have at least one son rarely have daughters who marry men who adopt their surname (because 
if there is at least one son, the son can carry on the family line), whereas some daughters 
(especially eldest daughters) who have only sisters marry men who adopt their surname in 
order to perpetuate the family line.  These results are consistent with the dynasty model 
because they underscore the eagerness of parents and their children to perpetuate the family 
line. 
Next, we focus on the relationship between perpetuating one’s family line and the 
living arrangements of elderly parents and their children.  Whereas only 0.6 percent (1/167) 
of sons who adopt their wife’s surname live with their own parents, 66.7 percent (32/48) of 
daughters who married a man who adopted their surname live with their own parents.  In 
addition, only 15.2 percent (56/368) of all eldest daughters live with their own parents, 
whereas 76.5 percent (26/34) of eldest daughters who married a man who adopted their 
surname live with their own parents.   Thus, there is a strong relationship between 
perpetuating one’s family line and the living arrangements of elderly parents and their children, 
with the child who carries on the family line tending to live with the parents.  This result is 
also consistent with the dynasty model for the reason explained in section 4.1.  
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To summarize our findings in this section, we find first that a substantial proportion 
(44 percent) of elderly parents with children live with their children in Japan, with this 
proportion reaching 62 percent in the case of those with three children.  Second, parents are 
more likely to live with their eldest son even if the eldest son is not the eldest child.  Third, if 
parents live independently, it is not necessarily the case that the eldest son lives closest to his 
parents.  Fourth, the daughters (especially the eldest daughters) of those with only daughters 
often marry men who adopt their surname in order to perpetuate the family line.  Fourth, 
there is a strong relationship between perpetuating one’s family line and the living 
arrangements of elderly parents and their children, with the child who carries on the family 
line tending to live with the parents.  And, as discussed above, many of these results are 
consistent with the dynasty model and/or social norms and traditions. 
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used in the Regression Analysis 
Next, we present descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our regression analysis 
for the full sample, the sample of parents living with their eldest son, the sample of parents 
living with a child other than the eldest son, and the sample of parents living independently.  
The results are shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2, with Table 3-1 showing the descriptive statistics for 
parents and Table 3-2 showing the descriptive statistics for children, and as can be seen from 
this table, the socioeconomic characteristics of parents differ considerably by living 
arrangements (except for the ages of the farther and mother).  In what follows, we organize our 
discussion of the descriptive statistics by theoretical model.  
 Looking first at variables relating to the dynasty model, as discussed in section 4.1, if the 
dynasty model applies, one would expect households in which the father was a self-employed 
worker before retirement to be more likely to live with their children, and as can be seen from 
Table 3-1, they are in fact much more likely to live with their eldest son and also slightly more 
likely to live with a child other than the eldest son than are other households.  Looking at other 
variables relating to the dynasty model, as discussed in section 4.1, if the dynasty model applies, 
we would expect parents whose sons adopt their wives’ surname to be less likely to live with 
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their children and parents whose daughter marries a man who adopts her surname to be more 
likely to live with children other than the eldest son, and as can be seen from Table 3-2, the 
former are indeed far less likely to live with the son who adopts his wife’s surname and the 
latter are indeed far more likely to live with the daughter who marries a man who adopts her 
surname.  All of these results constitute strong evidence in favor of the dynasty model. 
 Looking next at variables relating to the strategic bequest model, as explained in section 
4.1, if the strategic bequest model applies, we would expect parents who have high incomes 
and/or high educational attainments to be more likely to live with their children, but as can be 
seen from Table 3-1, parents with high incomes and/or high educational attainments are less 
likely to live with their children than are other households, contrary to expectation.  Turning to 
other variables relating to the strategic bequest model, as discussed in section 4.1, if the 
strategic bequest model applies, we would expect households in which the father was an 
executive before retirement and/or that own their own homes to be more likely to live with their 
children, and as Table 2-1 shows, households in which the father was an executive before 
retirement are more likely to live with a child other than the eldest son but less likely to live 
with their eldest son than are other households, while households that own their own homes are 
much more likely to live with their eldest son as well as with a child other than the eldest son 
than other households.  Thus, the results are mixed but provide some support for the strategic 
bequest model. 
 Looking next at variables relating to the altruism model, as explained in section 4.1, if 
the altruism model applies, one would expect parents to live with children with relatively low 
educational attainments, and as can be seen from Table 3-2, parents are more likely to live with 
sons and (to a lesser extent) daughters with low educational attainments than are other 
households.  Another test of the altruism model is to see if whether or not parents feel that they 
should sacrifice themselves for their children affects their likelihood of living with their children, 
and as can be seen from Table 3-1, parents holding this view are much more likely to live with 
their eldest son as well as with a child other than the eldest son than are other households.  
Finally, as discussed in section 4.1, the fact that several variables relating to the dynasty and 
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strategic bequest models appear to have the expected impact on parents’ likelihood of living 
with their children constitutes evidence unfavorable to the altruism model.  Thus, the results 
are mixed with some being favorable to the altruism model and some being unfavorable to it.  
 Looking finally at variables relating to social norms and traditions, as explained in 
section 4.1, if social norms and traditions are important, one would expect parents who feel that 
“children should live with their parents when their parents become old and cannot take care of 
themselves” to be more likely to live with their children and parents who feel that “it is the 
eldest son’s duty to take care of his parents” to be more likely to live with their eldest sons.  As 
can be seen from Table 3-1, the former are much more likely to live with a child other than the 
eldest son and with their eldest son than are other households, while the latter are much more 
likely to live with their eldest son than are other households.  These results provide strong 
support for the importance of social norms and traditions. 
 Thus, we find support for all theoretical models (the dynasty model, the strategic 
bequest model, the altruism model, and social norms and traditions).  However, it is risky to 
draw inferences from descriptive statistics alone because they do not control for other factors.  
Thus, more weight should be given to the regression results presented in the next section. 
 
6. Estimation Results 
In this section, we present our estimation results concerning the determinants of the living 
arrangements of parents and their children.  Table 4-1 shows the coefficient estimates and 
standard errors, while Table 4-2 shows the marginal effects.  We organize our discussion by 
theoretical model.  
First, we discuss our estimation results pertaining to the dynasty model.  The 
coefficient of hselfemployed is positive and significant in equations (1-a) and (1-b), whereas it 
is not significant in equations (2-a) and (2-b), which suggests that elderly parents are more 
likely to live with their eldest sons if the father was self-employed before retirement than if the 
father was a salaried worker before retirement.  We calculate the marginal effect of 
hselfemployed and find that the probability of the parents living with their eldest son is 0.15 
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percentage points higher in case (a) and 0.17 percentage points higher in case (b) for 
households in which the father was a self-employed worker before retirement (see Table 4-2).  
This result is presumably due to the fact that self-employed households are different from 
salaried worker households in that the former have a family business that they would like to 
pass on their children, especially their eldest son, and the child who carries on the family 
business is more likely to live with his or her parents because he or she will inherit the family 
business (which is often located in, or adjacent to, the family home).  Thus, our result is 
consistent with the dynasty model.  Moreover, the coefficient of kwifefamily2 is positive and 
significant in equations (2-a) and (2-b), and the marginal effect of kwifefamily2 suggests that 
having a daughter who marries a man who adopts her surname raises the probability of living 
with a child other than the eldest son by 0.26 percentage points in case (a) and 0.35 percentage 
points in case (b).  These results suggest that daughters who marry a man who adopts her 
surname are more likely to live with the daughter’s parents, a result that is also consistent with 
the dynasty model.   
Next, we discuss our estimation results pertaining to the strategic bequest model.  
Although the coefficients of phouse and peduc are not significant in any case, the coefficient of 
hexecutive is positive and significant in equations (2-a) and (2-b), and the marginal effect of 
hexecutive suggests that the probability of the parents living with a child other than the eldest 
son is 0.21 percentage points higher for households in which the father was a executive before 
retirement.  Since executives are presumably wealthier than those in other occupations, our 
finding that children other than eldest sons are more likely to live with their parents if their 
father was an executive before retirement is consistent with the strategic bequest model.  
Third, we discuss our estimation results pertaining to the altruism model.  The 
coefficient of eeduc is negative and marginally significant in equation (1-a) but insignificant in 
equation (1-b) and the coefficient of keduc is also not significant.  That is, parents do not 
necessarily live with less educated children, a result that is at variance with the altruism model 
because education is a good proxy for earning capacity and altruistic parents should show a 
tendency to leave a larger bequest to (and live with) less educated (poorer) children (see section 
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4.1 for more details).  Moreover, the coefficient of psacrifice is not significant in any case, 
which constitutes further evidence against the altruism model.  According to Tables 3-1 and 
3-2, the educational attainment of children and psacrifice have the expected impact on the living 
arrangements of parent and their children, but if the impact of other variables is controlled for 
via regression analysis, these variables no longer have a statistically significant impact on the 
living arrangements of parents and their children.  Finally, the fact that the impact of a number 
of variables relating to the dynasty and strategic bequest models were found to be significant 
and consistent with these models constitutes further evidence against the altruism model.   
Fourth, we discuss our estimation results pertaining to Japanese social norms and 
traditions.  Let us look at the coefficients of variables pertaining to parental attitudes towards 
their children.  First, the coefficient of pchildduty is positive and significant in case (2-b), 
suggesting that parents who think that children should live with their parents when the parents 
become old and cannot take care of themselves are more likely to live with a child other than the 
eldest son.  Second, the coefficient of pesonduty is positive and significant in case (2-a) and 
negative and significant in case (2-b), suggesting that parents who think that it is the duty of the 
eldest son to take care of his parents.  Looking at the marginal effects of pesonduty and 
pchildduty, the probability of living with their eldest son is 0.05 percentage points higher for 
parents who think that children should live with their parents, and the probability of living with 
a child other than the eldest son is 0.07 percentage points higher for such parents.  By contrast, 
the probability of living with the eldest son is 0.13 percentage points higher for parents who 
think that it is the duty of the eldest son to take care of his parents, and the probability of living 
with a child other than the eldest son is 0.11 percentage points lower for such parents.  As we 
discussed in Section 4, these results are consistent with Japanese social norms and traditions.   
Finally, we discuss the control variables.  The coefficient of psingle is positive and 
significant in all cases, which suggests that single parents are more likely to live with their 
children than two-parent households.  We calculate the marginal effect of psingle and find that 
the probability of living with their eldest son is 0.23 percentage points higher in case (a) and 
0.27 percentage points higher in case (b) for single parents, whereas the probability of living 
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with a child other than the eldest son is 0.15 percentage points higher in case (a) and 0.12 
percentage points higher in case (b) for single parents.  These are plausible results because, in 
two-parent households, the parents can take care of one other, whereas a single parent does not 
have this option and hence will be more likely to live with his/her children.  In addition, the 
coefficient of ksingle is positive and significant in cases (1-b) and (2-b), suggesting that parents 
are more likely to live with children who are not eldest sons and who are divorced.  This result 
suggests that parents live with, and give assistance to, their divorced children because divorced 
children are more likely to need assistance from their parents than married children.   
 To summarize our findings in this section, elderly parents are more likely to live with 
their eldest sons if the father was a self-employed worker before retirement, a result that is 
consistent with the dynasty model, whereas they are more likely to live with a child other than 
the eldest son if the father was an executive before retirement, a result that is consistent with the 
strategic bequest model.  In addition, daughters whose husbands adopt the daughter’s surname 
are more likely to live with the daughter’s parents, a result that is consistent with the dynasty 
model.  As for parental attitudes towards their children, parents who think that children should 
take care of their parents are more likely to live with a child other than the eldest son, whereas 
parents who think that it is the duty of the eldest son to take care of his parents are more likely 
to live with their eldest son.  Thus, many of our results are broadly consistent with the dynasty 
model, the strategic bequest model (which is consistent with the selfish life cycle model), and 
Japanese social norms and traditions, whereas we cannot find any results that are consistent with 
the altruism model.   
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the determinants of the living arrangements of elderly parents and 
their children (whether elderly parents live with their children, and if so, with which child) in 
Japan using micro data from the 1998 “National Survey of Families (in Japanese, Kazoku ni 
tsuiteno Zenkoku Chousa),” which was conducted in January 1999 and provided by the 
National Family Research of Japan and the Information Center for Social Science Research on 
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Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo (SSJ Data Archive). 
Our results show that the proportion of elderly parents living with their eldest sons is 
much higher than that of elderly parents living with children other than the eldest son, even if 
the eldest son is not the eldest child.  However, if parents live independently, it is not 
necessarily the case that the eldest son lives closest to his parents.  In addition, we find that 
elderly parents are more likely to live with their eldest sons if the father was a self-employed 
worker before retirement, whereas they are more likely to live with a child other than the 
eldest son if the father was an executive before retirement.  Furthermore, we find that 
daughters whose husbands adopt the daughter’s surname are more likely to live with the 
daughter’s parents.  All of these findings are consistent with the dynasty and/or strategic 
bequest (selfish life cycle) models.  We also find that the living arrangements of elderly 
parents are still very much based on Japanese social norms and traditions.  Thus, we find 
support for all models of household behavior other than the altruism model.  
 Turning to a comparison of our results with those of previous studies, our results are 
consistent with the results of Ohtake (1991), Ohtake and Horioka (1994), and Horioka, et al. 
(2000) in that we both find support for the strategic bequest model.  However, as far as we 
know, our study is the first to find support for the dynasty model and for social norms and 
traditions based on an analysis of the living arrangements of elderly parents and their children, 
and this was made possible by our richer data set, which includes detailed information on 
siblings and parental attitudes towards their children.  
We turn finally to directions for further research.  The survey we use in our analysis 
collects information on family structure and sibling composition, making it ideal for the 
purposes of the analysis here, but information on many socioeconomic characteristics (for 
example, the financial assets of parents and children, the income of each child, transfers from 
parents to each child and vice versa, etc.) is not available.  One direction for further research 
is to find a data source that includes information on these variables so that we can do a more 
rigorous analysis, especially of the strategic bequest model. 
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Composition of siblings Number of households Percentage (%)
Son (only child) 62 11.70
Daughter (only child) 44 8.30
One child 106 20.00
Eldest son-second son 86 16.23
Eldest son-eldest daughter 68 12.83
Eldest daughter-eldest son 79 14.91
Eldest daughter-second daughter 68 12.83
Two children 301 56.79
Eldest son-second son-third son 14 2.64
Eldest son-second son-eldest
daughter 17 3.21
Eldest son-eldest daughter-
second son 17 3.21
Eldest son-eldest daughter-
second daughter 10 1.89
Eldest daughter-eldest son-
second son 18 3.40
Eldest daughter-eldest son-
second daughter 15 2.83
Eldest daughter-second daughter-
eldest son 12 2.26
Eldest daughter-second daughter-
third daughter 20 3.77
Three children 123 23.21
Total 530 100.00
Table 1:  Composition of Children's Siblings
 
 
Sibling's birth order Number of observations
First-born 530
Second-born 423
Third-born 124
Total 1077
Data source: 1998 "National Survey of Families (in Japanese, Kazoku ni tsuiteno Zenokou
Chousa )," conducted in January 1999 by National Family Research.  
 
 26
Cohabiting
Composition of siblings Number of households 1st 2nd 3rd children
Son (only child) 62 26 (0.42) 26
Daughter (only child) 44 16 (0.36) 16
One child 106 42 (0.40) 42
Eldest son-second son 86 33 (0.38) 6 (0.07) 39
Eldest son-eldest daughter 68 23 (0.34) 5 (0.07) 28
Eldest daughter-eldest son 79 4 (0.05) 28 (0.35) 32
Eldest daughter-second
daughter 68 16 (0.24) 3 (0.04) 19
Two children 301 76 (0.25) 42 (0.14) 118
Eldest son-second son-third
son 14 5 (0.36) 1 (0.07) 1 (0.07) 7
Eldest son-second son-eldest
daughter 17 9 (0.53) 0 (0.00) 3 (0.18) 12
Eldest son-eldest daughter-
second son 17 10 (0.59) 2 (0.12) 1 (0.06) 13
Eldest son-eldest daughter-
second daughter 10 5 (0.50) 0 (0.00) 1 (0.10) 6
Eldest daughter-eldest son-
second son 18 3 (0.17) 6 (0.33) 1 (0.06) 10
Eldest daughter-eldest son-
second daughter 15 2 (0.13) 7 (0.47) 4 (0.27) 13
Eldest daughter-second
daughter-eldest son 12 0 (0.000) 2 (0.17) 5 (0.42) 7
Eldest daughter-second
daughter-third daughter 20 5 (0.25) 4 (0.20) 2 (0.10) 11
Three children 123 39 (0.32) 22 (0.18) 18 (0.15) 79
Total 530 157 64 18 239
Birth order
Table 2-1: Who Lives with His/Her Parents?
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Number of parents living Closest
Composition of siblings independently 1st 2nd 3rd children
Son (only child) 36 36 (1.00) 36
Daughter (old child) 28 28 (1.00) 28
One child 64 64 (1.00) 64
Eldest son-second son 48 38 (0.79) 36 (0.75) 74
Eldest son-eldest daughter 40 28 (0.70) 29 (0.73) 57
Eldest daughter-eldest son 47 36 (0.77) 38 (0.81) 74
Eldest daughter-second
daughter 49 38 (0.78) 35 (0.71) 73
Two children 184 140 (0.76) 138 (0.75) 278
Eldest son-second son-third
son 7 2 (0.29) 5 (0.71) 5 (0.71) 12
Eldest son-second son-eldest
daughter 5 1 (0.20) 3 (0.60) 4 (0.80) 8
Eldest son-eldest daughter-
second son 4 2 (0.50) 3 (0.80) 3 (0.75) 8
Eldest son-eldest daughter-
second daughter 4 1 (0.25) 3 (0.75) 2 (0.50) 6
Eldest daughter-eldest son-
second son 8 3 (0.38) 5 (0.63) 5 (0.63) 13
Eldest daughter-eldest son-
second daughter 5 4 (0.80) 3 (0.60) 4 (0.80) 11
Eldest daughter-second
daughter-eldest son 5 3 (0.60) 5 (1.00) 3 (0.60) 11
Eldest daughter-second
daughter-third daughter 9 5 (0.56) 5 (0.56) 5 (0.56) 15
Three children 47 21 (0.45) 32 (0.68) 31 (0.66) 84
Total 295 222 (0.75) 170 (0.58) 31 (0.11) 423
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Table 2-2: Who Lives Closest to His/Her Parents?
Birth order
Note: The totals do not necessarily add because, in some cases, more than one child lives with the parents or
lives closest to the parents.
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Parents All households (530)
Parents who live with their
eldest son (157)
Parents who live with children
other than the eldest son (78)
Parents who live
independently (295)
Mean (Standard deviation)
Father's age 70.36 70.37 72.08 70.01
(5.00) (5.16) (4.63) (4.95)
Mother's age 67.97 67.75 67.82 68.63
(4.95) (4.93) (5.00) (9.00)
Father's educational attainment (years) 10.89 10.58 10.60 11.08
(2.20) (2.10) (2.27) (2.22)
Mother's educational attainment (years) 10.48 10.05 10.25 10.76
(1.55) (1.44) (1.49) (1.58)
Father's income 222.69 167.45 188.33 261.17
(211.63) (183.33) (240.48) (86.46)
Mother's income 101.73 121.47 119.74 86.46
(147.46) (208.11) (177.99) (85.57)
Parents' income 324.42 288.92 308.08 347.63
(249.64) (247.97) (357.02) (211.75)
Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics for Parents 
Number of observations (percentage)
Divorced or widowed 134  (25.28)  55 (35.03)   29 (37.18)  50 (16.95)
Male 12 4 1 7
Homeownership rate   485 (91.51) 155 (98.73)  75 (96.15) 255 (86.44)
Health condition (good)
Father   242 (59.31) 66 (62.26)     27 (54.00)  149 (59.13)
Mother   311 (60.04) 86 (56.21) 41 (53.25) 184 (63.89) 
Education
High School Graduate
Father 164  (40.20) 37 (23.57) 15 (19.23)  112 (37.97)
Mother 246 (47.49) 53 (35.10) 32 (41.56) 161  (56.29)
College Graduate
Father 40 (9.80)  8 (5.10)   5 (6.41)   27 (9.15)
Mother 3 (0.58) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 3 (1.05)
Occupation before retirement (Father*)
Executive  46 (8.68)  9 (5.73)  9 (11.54)  28 (9.49) 
Salaried worker  249 (46.98)    64 (40.76)  32 (41.03)  153 (51.86)
Self-employed worker 145 (27.36)   56 (35.67)   20 (25.64)  69 (23.39)
Parents' attititudes towards their children
Parents should sacrifice themselves for
their children 353 (66.60)  113 (71.97)   58 (74.36) 182 (61.69) 
Children should live with their parents
when the parents become old and
cannot take care of themselves   356 (67.16)  120 (76.43)      63 (80.77)  173 (58.64) 
It is an eldest son's duty to take care of
his parents 252 (47.55)    99 (63.06)  28 (35.90)  125 (42.37) 
Data source:  The same as Table 1.
Notes: *In the case of widows, the occupation before retirement is that of the widow herself.
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Dependent variable: LIVING 
(parents live with the eldest son; parents live with a child other than the eldest son, and parents live independently)
Parents live with
their eldest son (=1)
or live
independently (=0)
Parents live with a
child other than the
eldest son (=1) or live
independently (=0)
Parents live with
their eldest son
(=1) or live
independently (=0)
Parents live with a child
other than the eldest son
(=1) or live
independently (=0)
(1-a) (2-a) (1-b) (2-b)
Explanatory variables
hselfemployed 0.639 ** 0.318 0.690 ** 0.527
the father was a self-employed worker before retirement (0.288) (0.531) (0.296) (0.553)
ewifefamily1 -7.684 0.545 -7.481 1.592 *
the eldest son adopts his wife's surname (1144.273) (1.253) (244.764) (0.854)
kwifefamily1 0.701 -0.122 0.712 -0.167
at least one son other than the eldest son adopts his
wife's surname (0.575) (1.051) (0.568) (1.091)
kwifefamily2 0.955 1.844 ** 0.697 2.687 **
at least one daughter marries a man who adopts her
surname (0.783) (0.668) (0.619) (0.721)
hexecutive 0.138 1.294 * 0.081 1.509 **
the father was an executive before retirement (0.484) (0.669) (0.460) (0.733)
phouse 7.922 1.433 7.735 1.284
the parents are homeowners (260.263) (1.206) (110.484) (0.979)
eeduc -0.163 * -0.165 -0.133 -0.107
the educational attainment of the eldest son (in years) (0.081) (0.128) (0.084) (0.139)
psacrifice 0.040 0.092
parents feel that they should sacrifice themselves for
their children (0.270) (0.481)
pchildduty 0.245 2.117 ***
parents feel that children should live with their parents
when the parents become old and cannot take care of
themselves (0.297) (0.633)
pesonduty 0.485 * -1.879 ***
parents feel that it is the eldest son's duty to take care of
his parents (0.271) (0.516)
Table 4-1: Estimation Results
 
psingle 1.223 *** 1.599 *** 1.191 *** 1.784 ***
single parent (0.364) (0.431) (0.327) (0.513)
phealth -0.084 -0.148 -0.039 0.217
one or both parents are unhealthy (0.236) (0.356) (0.237) (0.446)
efirstmarriage 0.340 0.976 * 0.273 1.189 *
the eldest son married first (0.335) (0.569) (0.327) (0.623)
ksingle 1.081 1.575 ** 0.164 1.410 *
at least one child other than the eldest son is single (0.749) (0.876) (0.622) (0.759)
seniorsister 0.430 0.375 0.418 -0.009
the eldest son has an older sister (0.356) (0.584) (0.362) (0.698)
alternative 1/alternative 0 131/173 32/173 131/173 32/173
Log simulated-likelihood -217.765 -217.765 -217.765 -217.765
Chi 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
sigma1-2 -0.082 -0.082 -0.990 -0.990
sigma1-3
Data source:  The same as Table 1.
pincome, peduc, page, hparttimer, esingle, eage, keduc, three,  and a constant are included in all specifications,
but their coefficients are suppressed.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1 percent level. **significant at the 5 percent level, *significant at the 1 percent level.
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 Dependent variable: LIVING 
(parents live with their eldest son; parents live with a child other than the eldest son, and parents live independently)
Parents who live with the
eldest son
Parents who live with a child
other than the eldest son Parents live independently
Case (a)
Explanatory variables
hselfemployed 0.152 0.009 -0.161
the father was a self-employed worker before retirement
ewifefamily1 -0.342 0.144 0.199
the eldest son adopts his wife's surname
kwifefamily1 0.193 -0.033 -0.160
at least one son other than the eldest son adopts his wife's surname
kwifefamily2 0.111 0.264 -0.376
at least one daughter marries a man who adopts her surname
hexecutive -0.041 0.212 -0.171
the father was an executive before retirement
phouse 0.393 0.044 -0.437
the parents are homeowners
eeduc -0.034 -0.011 0.045
the educational attainment of the eldest son (in years)
psingle 0.232 0.151 -0.384
single parent
Table 4-2: Marginal Effects
 
Parents who live with their
eldest son
Parents who live with a child
other than the eldest son Parents live independently
Case (b)
Explanatory variables
hselfemployed 0.166 0.021 -0.187
the father was a self-employed worker before retirement
ewifefamily1 -0.341 0.204 0.137
the eldest son adopts his wife's surname
kwifefamily1 0.187 -0.011 -0.176
at least one son other than the eldest son adopts his wife's surname
kwifefamily2 0.074 0.353 -0.427
at least one daughter marries a man who adopts her surname
hexecutive 0.081 1.509 0.138
the father was an executive before retirement
phouse 7.735 1.284 7.922
the parents were homeowners
eeduc -0.031 -0.004 0.034
the educational attainment of the eldest son (in years)
psacrifice 0.009 0.004 -0.013
parents feel that they should sacrifice themselves for their children
pchildduty 0.047 0.068 -0.115
parents feel that children should live with their parents when the parents
become old and cannot take care of themselves
pesonduty 0.126 -0.111 -0.015
parents feel that it is the eldest son's duty to take care of his parents
psingle 0.270 0.115 -0.385
single parent
Note: Marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means.
Data source: The same as Table 1.  
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 Endnotes 
                                                     
1 A large number of detailed studies have analyzed living arrangements and residential choice, but 
studies that focus on the case of multiple children are limited in spite of its importance.  There are 
some studies for countries other than Japan that analyze living arrangements in the case of multiple 
children (e.g., Hoerger et al. (1996), Hiedmann and Stern (1999), Engers and Stern (2002), and 
Konrad et al. (2002)), but there are few studies that focus on the relationship between living 
arrangements and bequest motives.   
2 A large number of detailed studies have analyzed living arrangements (e.g., Kotlikoff and Morris 
(1990), Ohtake (1991), Ohtake and Horioka (1994), Hayashi (1995), Yashiro et al. (1997), Funaoka 
et al. (1999), and Iwamoto and Fukui (2001)) (see Iwamoto and Fukui (2001) for more details on 
living arrangements in Japan), but in this section, we introduce only previous studies that focus on 
the relationship between living arrangements and bequest motives. 
3 Most previous studies assume that the amount of care a child gives to his or her parents and the 
distance between the residences of the parent and child are negatively correlated, but Hirdmann and 
Stern (1999) find that family members’ valuation of care provided by a child depends positively on 
the distance between the residences of the parent and child.  In this paper, we test the strategic 
bequest model on the assumption that the amount of care a child provides to his or her parents is a 
negative function of the distance between the residences of the parent and child, with children living 
with the parents providing the most care. 
4 This social norm was codified in the Meiji Civil Code (promulgated in 1898), which specifies that 
the eldest son will receive the parents’ entire estate, but the new civil code (promulgated in 1947) 
specifies equal division of the bequest among one’s children as the default (although it is possible to 
divide one’s estate differently if one leaves a will). 
5 We defined retired households as households in which the father's current age is 60 or older and 
neither the father nor the mother is working. 
6 Parents who live with both the eldest son and a child other than the eldest son were classified as 
living with the eldest son only because our estimation method did not allow us to classify them in 
both categories (there were two such observations).  Thus, strictly speaking, this category should be 
called “parents who do not live with the eldest son but live with another child.” 
7 Because of the possibility that there is multicollinearity among the proportions of respondents 
adhering to the three views, we checked for this possibility and obtained the following results: the 
correlation between the proportions of respondents adhering to views (a) and (b) is 0.195, that 
between the proportions of respondents adhering to views (a) and (c) is 0.266, and that between the 
proportions of respondents adhering to views (b) and (c) is 0.384.  Thus, the correlation between 
the proportions of respondents adhering to views (b) and (c) is the highest, but even this correlation 
is not overwhelmingly high.     
8 We use the asmprobit command in STATA to estimate multinomial probit models (MNP) using 
maximum simulated likelihood.  In the case of this command, the quasi-Monte Carlo integration 
(Hammersley sequence) is implemented using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm.   
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